We report results from a randomized policy experiment designed to test whether increased audit risk deters rent extraction in local public procurement and service delivery in Brazil. Our estimates suggest that temporarily increasing annual audit risk by about 20 percentage points reduced the proportion of irregular local procurement processes by about 17 percentage points.
Introduction
Waste and corruption are two key determinants of the cost of public service provision. However, measuring objectively whether public of cials extract rents-either through shirking on the job or outright embezzlement of public funds-is notoriously challenging. 1 It is even more challenging to assess whether rent extraction is responsive to policy intervention because topdown monitoring policies in particular are only rarely truly or "as if" randomly assigned.
In this paper we report results from a randomized policy experiment designed to test whether higher audit risk deters waste and corruption in local public procurement and improves public service provision at the municipality (município) level in Brazil. 2 Following the economic approach to crime (Becker 1968) , an of cial will shirk or steal if and only if the expected utility from doing so exceeds utility under the person's best alternative. While higher audit risk should lower the expected gain from shirking or stealing and hence deter rent extraction, the magnitude of this effect depends on the probability that sanctions are applied conditional on detection. In the Brazilian setting analyzed here, as in many other countries, the probability that local of cials or service providers are punished through nes, loss of mandate or prison time is typically considered to be very low (Arantes 2004; Chaudhury, Hammer, Kremer, Muralidharan, and Rogers 2006) . To what extent higher audit risk deters waste and corruption in such environments
is therefore an open and important empirical question (Olken and Pande 2011).
Our research design relies on the randomization of 120 municipalities into a treatment group, exposed to a roughly 20 percentage points higher annual probability of being audited than the 5 percent audit risk in the control group, effectively consisting of the 5,400 remaining municipalities in Brazil. The randomization was designed by the Brazilian federal government internal audit agency (Controladoria-Geral da União, CGU) and carried out and publicly announced in 1 Di Tella and Schargrodski (2003) look at prices paid by hospitals for basic supplies before and after a crackdown on corruption. Reinikka and Svensson (2004) examine the difference between funds disbursed by the central government and funds reportedly recieved by schools. Golden and Picci (2005) compare physical public infrastructure to the cumulative amount of government spending on that infrastructure. Olken (2007) computes "missing" expenditures in road construction using independent cost estimates provided by engineers. Ferraz and Finan (2011) construct corruption measures based on Brazilian local government audit reports. Litschig and Zamboni (2012) use the same audit reports to measure rents more broadly, without distinguishing between waste and corruption. Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2012) compare of cial micro-records of a large Indian workfare program to household survey data. 2 Municipalities are the lowest level of government in Brazil (below the federal and state governments). May 2009. 3 In order to ensure that municipalities were aware of their treatment status, mayors in treatment group municipalities also received a letter from CGU, stating that they were part of a group of 120 municipalities, 30 out of which would be audited one year later. 4 In May 2010, CGU sampled 30 treatment as well as 30 control municipalities as part of the regular random auditing process. From May 2010 onwards, treatment group municipalities were again exposed to a roughly 5 percent annual audit probability. 5 The treatment thus consisted of a temporary increase in audit risk of about 20 percentage points. In order to increase sample size, we supplement the 60 municipalities sampled for an audit in May 2010 with 60 control group municipalities that were sampled two months earlier in March 2010.
We measure rents as irregularities in local public procurement and service delivery uncovered by CGU auditors. If compliance with homogeneous national regulations is socially benecial, irregularities in procurement or service delivery uncovered by auditors provide an objective measure of rent extraction by local executive of cials, either through outright corruption or low effort on the job. 6 For the vast majority of the regulations considered by auditors in Brazil, compliance is likely to be socially bene cial although typically privately costly. 7 For example, procurement regulations are designed to ensure that the public pays the lowest price available for a given good or service required, yet implementing a competitive procurement procedure, such as a (reverse) auction, is privately costly for the local manager. 8 Similarly, health ministry regulations require medical staff to provide certain service hours, which is again privately costly, yet bene cial for service users.
Our data on public procurement and service delivery irregularities are non-public and serve as the basis for the published audit reports used in Ferraz and Finan (2011), Brollo, Nannicini, Perotti, and Tabellini (2012) , and Litschig and Zamboni (2012) . The procurement data are at 3 We introduced the idea of conducting a randomized evaluation to CGU staff and were involved in the early design stage of the project. 4 This implies that we cannot disentangle the effect of simply receiving a letter from CGU from the effect of exposure to a higher audit probability. However, the effect of the letter "treatment" is likely to be orders of magnitude smaller than the effect of exposure to an objectively higher audit risk.
5 Treatment group municipalities were therefore never exposed to lower audit risk than those in the control group. 6 Effort can be seen as negative rents as in Barro (1973) and Persson and Tabellini (2000) . 7 In the terminology of Bandiera, Prat and Valletti (2009) we think of irregularities uncovered by auditors as a measure of active waste in government spending: compliance is socially bene cial yet privately costly. 8 Auriol, Straub and Flochel (2011) provide evidence on the excess costs for taxpayers associated with restricted procurement modalities, such as "exceptional" procedures by which regular public tenders are disregarded. the individual process level and span the entire range of locally provided public services in Brazil, including preventive and primary health care, elementary education, housing and urban infrastructure, and transportation. The service delivery data are based on locally representative household surveys conducted by CGU auditors as part of their standard eld work. We focus on two nation-wide programs, the family and preventive health program (Saúde da Família) and the conditional cash transfer program (Bolsa Família). 9
While we distinguish irregularities indicating mismanagement or corruption from what we call procedural irregularities-where the connection to inef ciency is only indirect-we do not attempt to identify proper corruption episodes. 10 Our reasons for doing so are twofold. First, irregularities are based on objectively veri able facts, while identi cation of corruption inevitably requires judgment since few cases are clear-cut in practice. CGU auditors themselves explicitly abstain from making such judgments and leave it to prosecutors to decide whether to further investigate certain irregularities and potentially press charges against particular individuals. Our second reason is that the law is not limited to penalizing corruption, which requires a relatively high standard of proof because individuals can go to jail if convicted, but allows prosecutors to charge individuals with the lesser offense of "acts of administrative misconduct". Since higher audit risk should operate on both corruption and administrative misconduct, a comprehensive measure of rents is more appropriate for our purposes.
Our main empirical result provides clear evidence in favor of the prediction that local ofcials reduce rent extraction in procurement in response to higher audit risk. Our estimates suggest that temporarily increasing annual audit risk by about 20 percentage points reduced the proportion of irregular local procurement processes by about 17 percentage points. This reduction was driven entirely by irregularities involving mismanagement or corruption. Higher audit risk also reduced the proportion of restricted (and privately less costly to execute) procurement modalities adopted by local managers but did not reduce the value of local purchases made during the study period. Whether the impacts on irregularities re ect a net reduction in rent 9 There are other major programs, in education for example, as well as programs and projects that run only in a subset of municipalities, for which we do not have the survey data.
10 Our mismanagement or corruption coding is almost identical to the "Broad corruption" coding in Brollo, Nannicini, Perotti, and Tabellini (2012) , yet considerably broader than the corruption coding in Ferraz and Finan (2011) . See Table  6 and Section 5 for a more detailed comparison. extraction or merely a substitution over time-with managers in high audit risk municipalities sitting out the period of increased scrutiny and making up at least some lost rents in subsequent periods, a "golden goose" effect in the terminology of Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2012)-we cannot say. In either case, however, the results provide strong empirical support for the economic approach to crime (Becker 1968) .
In contrast to the reduction in rent extraction we nd in procurement, we nd no evidence that increased audit risk affected the quality of preventive and primary health care services provided under the Saúde da Família program. Since potential punishments for serious irregularities in procurement include jail, while for service delivery they only include nes or loss of the job, differences in potential punishments might drive the difference in results. A complementary interpretation is that irregularities in service provision cannot be identi ed with the same precision as irregularities in procurement and so higher audit risk might matter less to service providers, compared to procurement of cials. Irregularities in procurement are relatively easy to identify because local of cials are required to document each step of the process. In contrast, the behavior of local service providers is much harder to verify through a CGU audit.
For example, while health facility users might complain about infrequent opening hours of the health post, health staffers could easily dispute this fact and auditors would have a hard time verifying any of these competing claims. 11 We also nd no evidence that higher audit risk had an effect on local compliance with national regulations of the conditional cash transfer program Bolsa Família, measured in terms of appropriate inclusion of bene ciaries into the program or their compliance with health and education conditionalities. Again, differences in punishment are likely to be part of the explanation for the zero effect since the punishment for overstating the number of kids in the household or for not sending them to school, for example, is at most the loss of the bene t. Similarly, administrative consequences of oversight failures by local program managers are limited. Another interpretation, which is supported in our data, is that local compliance with Bolsa Família requirements could not respond to higher audit risk because families and local administrators 11 Another interpretation is that there simply was not that much shirking on the job in preventive and basic health care delivery. We consider this possibility less likely since many control group respondents indicated that they did not receive the health care services required by ministry of health regulations.
were already compliant to a large extent. 12 To our knowledge the only antecedent to our study is Olken (2007) , who examines the effect of a higher audit probability on corruption in road construction in Indonesia. As in our case, Olken's randomized research design essentially evaluates the effect of a temporary (and project-speci c) increase in audit risk. He nds that an increased probability of a government audit, from a baseline of 4 percent to 100 percent, reduces missing expenditures by 8 percentage points. Importantly for our study, he also nds that administrative irregularities in road construction detected by central government auditors are positively correlated with missing expenditures as determined by independent engineers. The drawback of not having a monetary corruption measure in our study is therefore limited. The advantages of our procurement irregularities are that they measure rents more broadly, encompassing both waste and corruption, and that they are available for government procurement across the entire range of locally provided public services in Brazil, not only for road construction. Moreover, the survey data on user satisfaction allow us to go beyond input measures and examine potential effects on public service delivery.
As in any study on corruption or rent extraction we cannot rule out that part of the impact we nd is due to fewer cases of corruption and mismanagement being detected in the high audit risk group; that is, perhaps local of cials simply try harder (and sometimes succeed) to hide mismanagement and corruption episodes in response to increased audit risk. While this might be part of the story, there are two main reasons why reporting differences are unlikely to account for the entire impact. First, hiding malfeasance is costly, so there will be instances where this extra cost exceeds the expected bene ts of committing the offense (Becker 1968) . Second, the evidence from Indonesia suggests that missing expenditures were reduced in response to higher audit risk, and there is likely less underdetection of corruption in missing expenditures compared to irregularities reported in routine audits. If missing expenditures and administrative irregularities are positively correlated also in Brazil then at least part of the impact we nd re ects a real reduction in rent extraction.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the audits program and give institutional background on potential judicial, administrative, and political punishments that may arise from the detection of irregularities in the local public administration. Section 3 presents theoretical predictions regarding the effect of higher audit risk on shirking or stealing by local of cials or service providers. We discuss the experimental design in Section 4. In Section 5 we present the data on irregularities in local public procurement and service delivery. In Section 6 we describe our estimation approach and discuss robustness checks. Results are presented in Section 7. We conclude with a discussion of limitations and extensions. The program is implemented by the general comptroller's of ce (CGU), the internal audit institution of the federal government. When a municipality is selected, the CGU headquarters in Brasilia determines the speci c aspects of programs and projects that are audited and issues detailed inspection orders (ordens de serviço)-standardized sets of program-or project-speci c inspections-to state CGU branches. For simplicity we will usually refer to service orders as inspections, although technically service orders are sets of inspections. Teams of auditors that are based in these state branches are then sent to the sampled municipality. Transfers eligible for audit include those that are earmarked to carry out national health and education policies 13 More speci cally, eligibility for federal audit is based on a population threshold which was successively increased from 20,000 to 500,000.
(legais), direct transfers to citizens (diretas), as well as other negotiated transfers (voluntarias), but exclude revenue-sharing transfers. Inspections occur for a subset of eligible federal transfers made during the preceding two to three years. 14 The number of auditors dispatched depends on municipality size (area and population), the proportion of rural and urban areas and the number of inspection orders, which in turn depends on the number of programs and projects running in the municipality. For instance, a municipality with a small population and a low number of items to be checked, but with a large rural area may require more auditors than another municipality with larger population but more people living in urban areas. In addition, municipalities for which the CGU has received a lot of complaints or where the mayor was recently impeached, receive larger teams.
Within a week of the municipality sampling, auditors spend about two weeks in the municipality in order to carry out their inspection orders. The quality of public services is assessed through interviews with the local population and service staff members. Auditors then report the results of their inspections back to CGU headquarters. Auditors also write a report, detailing the irregularities encountered during their mission. Municipality mayors are given the possibility to comment on the draft report within ve business days. Auditors in turn explain whether or not they accept the mayor's justi cation of problems found.
Potential judicial, administrative and political punishments
Final audit reports are sent to local legislatures, the federal ministries which are remitting the transfers, external audit institutions at state and federal levels, as well as state and federal prosecutors. Reports are also released to the media.
Potential judicial punishments depend on prosecutors who decide whether to further investigate the irregularities uncovered by auditors and whether and what charges to press against particular individuals. If convicted of corruption, defendants may be imprisoned for 1 to 8 years, in addition to losing their mandate and incurring nes. If convicted of "acts of administrative misconduct" or "improbity", punishments include the loss of mandate, the suspension of political rights for 8 to 10 years, prohibition from entering into public contracts for 10 years as well as the obligation to reimburse public coffers. 15 In addition to these potential judicial punishments, administrative and political punishments are also possible. For example, line ministries can stop transferring funds to the municipal administration if central government program managers deem the uncovered irregularities serious enough. This type of punishment is swift and potentially costly for the mayor in terms of electoral prospects, as emphasized in Brollo (2012) . Even if funds are not reduced, voters may react to the mere release and local dissemination of audit ndings by updating their views on the quality of the incumbent mayor (Ferraz and Finan 2011) . 16 Again, this type of punishment is swift and potentially costly for mayors on election day.
Theoretical predictions
Following the economic approach to crime, a procurement of cial or service provider will shirk or steal if and only if the expected utility from doing so exceeds utility under the person's best alternative. Expected utility depends on the magnitude of sanctions if caught and the probability of their application. Using Becker's (1968) notation, let Y denote the income or monetary equivalent of committing an irregularity, f the ne or monetary equivalent of the punishment, p the probability that the punishment is applied and U i .Y / person i's utility function, which is assumed increasing in Y . The expected utility from shirking or stealing is then as follows:
In this simple framework, the person will shirk or steal if and only if E.U i / i , where i denotes i's best alternative. It is clear that if higher audit risk increases p-thereby lowering the expected utility from shirking or stealing-some people will be deterred from committing an irregularity:
See Arantes (2004) on the organization and legal instruments at the disposal of the Brazilian Ministerio Público. 16 Our relatively small sample size precludes meaningful subgroup analysis. We have investigated, for example, whether higher audit risk has a different effect on rent extraction for rst-or second-term mayors and found no economically or statistically signi cant difference there. Results are available on request.
But the magnitude of this effect depends on the probability that sanctions are applied conditional on being audited. Let p c denote the probability of sanctions conditional on receiving an audit and p a the probability of a central government audit, so that p D p c p a . 17 Then:
This equation makes it clear that the same variation in audit risk affects expected utility differently, depending on the probability that sanctions are applied conditional on being audited and depending on the severity of sanctions. Speci cally, the predicted reduction of irregularities due to higher audit risk is stronger, the more likely it is that sanctions are applied conditional on detection and the more severe the punishment. Since in our case potential punishments for serious irregularities in procurement include jail, while for service delivery they only include nes or loss of the job, the economic approach to crime provides a simple interpretation of our differential results for procurement and service delivery. A complementary interpretation is that irregularities in service provision cannot be identi ed with the same precision as irregularities in procurement-p c is likely lower in service delivery-and so higher audit risk should matter less to service providers, compared to procurement of cials.
Experimental design
The randomization was designed by the Brazilian federal government internal audit agency (Controladoria-Geral da União, CGU) and carried out on May 12 2009. The machinery used for the selection of treatment group municipalities was the same as that used for regular CGU audits and the results were later broadcast on television and through other media. The randomization of 120 municipalities into the treatment group was strati ed by state as shown in Table   1 . At the time of the randomization it was publicly announced that out of the 120 municipalities in the treatment group, 30 would be sampled for a regular CGU audit one year later in May 2010. 18 It was also announced that the 120 municipalities in the treatment group were not eligible for regular CGU audits until May 2010, while the control group, consisting of the 17 For simplicity we assume that the probability of detection of the irregularity conditional on being audited is 1. remaining 5,400 municipalities, could be sampled during regular lotteries as usual. 19 In order to ensure that municipalities were aware of their treatment status, mayors in treatment group municipalities also received a letter from CGU containing the above information.
While the initially announced (ex ante) probability of an audit for treatment group municipalities was thus 25 percent, the corresponding annual audit risk for control municipalities depended on the number of lotteries and the probability of being sampled in each of these.
From May 2009 to May 2010 there were four regular lotteries, namely the 29 th , 30 th , 31 st and 32 nd , as illustrated in Figure 1 . Table 2 presents the audit probabilities that municipalities from different states faced in the 29 th lottery. For most states, audit probabilities per round of the lottery-P(Draw)-were between 1 and 2 percent. These probabilities were essentially unchanged from previous rounds because setting aside 120 municipalities for the treatment group only marginally reduced the sample of municipalities eligible for audit in the rest of Brazil.
In the 32 nd regular lottery, the details of which were announced on April 30 2010, 30 municipalities were drawn from the treatment group and 30 from the control group. 20 Table 3 shows that, because sampling in both groups was strati ed by state, ex post audit probabilities in the treatment group varied between 16.7 percent and 50 percent, with a modal probability of 25 percent. Since the details of the actual sampling scheme used in May 2010 were unknown to the public until a few days before the 32 nd lottery, the relevant annual audit risk for treatment group municipalities that could have affected the behavior of local of cials likely was 25 percent.
Under the assumption that the probabilities of being drawn in the 29 th , 30 th , and 31 st lotteries were the same as in the 29 th lottery, the corresponding annual audit risk for control municipali-ties can be approximated as follows: were thus exposed to a roughly 20 percentage points higher annual probability of being audited than control group municipalities. From May 2010 onwards, treatment and control group municipalities were again exposed to the same audit risks they had been exposed to prior to May 2009. The treatment thus consisted of a temporary increase in audit risk of about 20 percentage points. In order to increase sample size, we supplement the 60 municipalities sampled for an audit in May 2010 with 60 control group municipalities that were sampled two months earlier, in March 2010. Note that these municipalities were exposed to exactly the same annual audit risk as the control group municipalities that were sampled in May 2010 (see Figure 1 ).
Data
Having described some key features of the Brazilian control system and the experimental design, we now present our micro-data on irregularities in local public procurement and public service delivery in more detail. Our empirical analysis is based on a random sample of 60 + 60 municipalities that have been audited in March and May 2010, respectively. Audit ndings for each municipality were compiled into a database by CGU staff. Following the practice of the comptroller general's of ce, we refer to the reported infractions of public sector management regulations as irregularities in public administration. It is worth emphasizing that each reported irregularity constitutes a breach of a speci c legal norm by a local of cial or service provider and is potentially subject to prosecution by state procuracies.
Local public procurement data
In contrast to the publicly available audit reports used in prior work, our procurement data are at the level of the individual procurement process. The procurements cover all purchases made with federal funds during the audit period, from January 2009 to May 2010 for the 32 nd lottery and from January 2008 to December 2009 for the 31 st lottery as illustrated in Figure 1 . 21 Unfortunately, however, total purchase amounts, unit prices and amounts affected by irregularities are not routinely collected by auditors. 22 The procurement data span the entire range of locally provided public services in Brazil, including preventive and primary health care, elementary education, housing and urban infrastructure, and transportation. 23 While the total number of processes is lower in the high audit risk group, there is no evidence that these municipalities received less funding from the central government, as shown in Section 7 below. Table 5 presents the distribution of procurement modalities by the level of audit risk-high vs. low-and lottery. The unit of observation is again an individual procurement process. There are six modalities in total, three of which restrict the number of competitors and are legal only below certain purchase amounts, and another three modalities without restrictions on the num- 21 Because the date of each procurement process is not given in our data, only the year, we cannot exclude processes that were completed prior to May 2009. The inclusion of these processes-which could not have been affected by higher audit risk by construction-will bias our estimates towards zero.
22 To be precise, auditors are not required to report this information back to headquarters. Auditors are allowed to report total purchase amounts, unit prices and an estimate of resources affected by irregularities in the publicly available CGU audit reports. The exact amount diverted can only be assessed through a more detailed inspection which occurs only if it is subsequently deemed appropriate by the prosecutor in charge of the municipality. 23 Nevertheless, from a statistical perspective, the three distributions are different according to Pearson's chi-square test.
ber of competitors. 24 We refer to restricted procurement modalities as direct purchases by the local administration, "bids only by invitation" (convite), a modality which leaves it at the total discretion of the local administration whom to "invite", 25 and the modality "only pre-registered bidders" (tomada de preços), which restricts competition to pre-registered suppliers. 26 Unrestricted modalities are the "sealed-bid (reverse) auction" (concorrência), "on-site (reverse) auction" (pregão presencial) and "electronic (reverse) auction" (pregão eletrõnico).
A noteworthy feature of the data in Table 5 is that in the control group from the 32 nd lottery, there were 189 procurement processes of the restricted modality "bids only by invitation", but there were only 98 processes using this modality in the treatment group. Similarly, of the modality "only pre-registered bidders", there were 66 processes in the control group from the 32 nd lottery but only 44 in the treatment group. For the unrestricted modalities, "sealed-bid (reverse) auction", "on-site (reverse) auction" and "electronic (reverse) auction", the numbers of processes in treatment and control groups are essentially equal. It is also interesting to note that there are some differences in the proportions of procurement modalities between control municipalities from the 31 st and 32 nd lotteries, suggesting that pooling across lotteries may not be appropriate for these outcomes. The fact that in the high audit risk group there are fewer restricted modalities-legal only for small purchase amounts-is consistent with the observation above that the number of procurement processes is also lower in this group. Table 6 presents CGU auditors' classi cation of irregularities in procurement as well as corruption and mismanagement codings by ourselves (LZ), Ferraz and Finan (FF, 2011), and Brollo, Nannicini, Perotti, and Tabellini (BNPT, 2012) . For example, one of the corruption categories in Ferraz and Finan, which they call "over-invoicing", in which "auditors determined that the goods and services were purchased at a value above market price", corresponds to our "unjusti ed or excessive payments for goods and services" type. Their "irregular public procurement", which is when "there is an illegal call-for-bids where the contract was awarded to a "friendly rm" and the public good was not provided" corresponds to a subset of our "simulated tender process", and "evidence of favoritism" types, where non-provision of the good or service was somehow con rmed, which we do not distinguish in our data. In procurement, a mismanagement episode occurs when "less than three rms bid for a public contract", corresponding to our "invitation for bids to less than three rms". Brollo et al. (BNPT, 2012 ) also use the CGU audit reports to construct a narrow and a broad corruption measure. Table 6 shows that our narrow corruption codings coincide perfectly and that their broad corruption coding essentially corresponds to the joint set of our mismanagement or corruption irregularities. Their narrow corruption measure includes cases of "limited competition", corresponding roughly to our "evidence of favoritism" category, "fraud", corresponding to our "simulated tender process", and "manipulation of the bid value", which we label "fractionalizing of procurement amounts", that is, division of a purchase into smaller amounts in order to avoid unrestricted procurement modalities. Their narrow de nition of corruption also includes cases of "favoritism in the good receipt", which we do not distinguish in our data, as well as "over-invoicing", which amounts to our "unjusti ed or excessive payments for goods and services" category. In their broad measure of corruption, Brollo et al. include "an irregular rm wins the bid process", corresponding roughly to our "participating ineligible rm", "the minimum number of bids is not attained", which we label "invitation for bids to less than three rms", as well as "the required procurement procedure is not executed", which is our "procurement modality too restricted". Table 7 presents the distribution of audit results for procurement by the level of audit riskhigh vs. low-and lottery. Several features of the data stand out. First, the share of irregular processes, that is, those that were found to be non-compliant with procurement regulations in one way or another is about 0.62 and 0.64 in the control groups from the 32 nd and 31 st lotteries, respectively, but only about 0.46 in the high audit risk group. Second, a comparison of audit ndings across control municipalities from the 31 st and 32 nd lotteries reveals that the proportions are somewhat dissimilar for many categories. Since we are primarily interested in capturing evidence of mismanagement or corruption, rather than identifying proper corruption episodes, these differences are without consequence for our study. The important fact is that the share of procurement processes indicating mismanagement or corruption in the two control groups is very close, 0.44 for the 32 nd and 0.49 for the 31 st lottery, respectively, while the corresponding share in the high audit risk group is 0.27.
Survey data
As part of their standard service orders, CGU auditors conduct interviews and eld visits that are designed to assess public service quality at both the household and service-unit level. 27 The exact number of respondents can vary depending on conditions in the eld.
Caveats
There are two main caveats worth pointing out regarding our measures of rent extraction. 28 First, we assume that existing regulations on procurement and service delivery-which de ne irregularities-make sense, that is, they serve a legitimate purpose in a reasonable way. Put differently, we take irregularities to be generally detrimental to public service delivery, rather than re ecting attempts by well-meaning of cials to circumvent inef cient red tape. As mentioned above, mayors, managers and service providers have the possibility to comment on the audit report. Sometimes auditors concede that there are valid arguments for non-compliance and we exclude these instances from our measures. Based on our reading of the regulations considered here, we believe that reported irregularities are for the most part undesirable from a social point of view because they either involve a direct waste or loss of public resources or complicate the detection of such mismanagement. It is also worth noting that the regulations pertaining to public procurement re ect international best practices as laid out in the WTO's Agreement on Government Procurement.
The second caveat is that we need to assume that auditors themselves were not bribed into manipulating audit ndings (Mookherjee and Png, 1995) . If this manipulation were for some reason correlated with treatment status, it would bias our estimates. However, we believe that the institutional setup makes it very unlikely that auditors are corrupt. First, auditors are paid by the federal government, not by local governments, which makes it less likely that they are captured by local special interests. Second, auditors are relatively well paid, and therefore have a lot to loose in case collusion gets detected. Third, auditors work in teams of about 10 people on average. This makes it hard to sustain collusion on any signi cant scale because the whole team has to be bribed in order to conceal irregularities. Fourth, the interaction between auditors and local of cials is at a single point in time (unknown ex ante), which again makes it harder to sustain collusion. Finally, CGU auditors' work is itself subject to periodic inspection from the external audit agency of the central government, the Tribunal de Contas da União and we are not aware of any reported cases of collusion between CGU auditors and local administrations. 28 Only the rst caveat is genuine to our study. The other applies to measures of waste and corruption more generally.
Municipality and mayor characteristics
Data on municipality characteristics are obtained from several sources. Of cial local population data for the year 2007 are from the population count conducted by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geogra a e Estatística (IBGE). Data on local income distribution, schooling, and federal transfers are from the Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada (IPEA) based on the 2000 census.
Mayor characteristics and party af liations are from the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE). Table 8 gives difference in means tests for a host of pre-treatment covariates. With the exception of one party af liation dummy, none of these differences are statistically signi cant and the magnitudes are generally small. Table 8 also provides a joint test of the null hypotheses that the population means of these covariates are equal across treatment and control groups. The Fstatistic suggests that the randomization worked, that is, it fails to reject the null at conventional levels of signi cance (p-value=0.44).
Estimation approach and robustness checks
Given the randomized experimental design, estimation is a straightforward comparison of sample mean outcomes from treatment and comparison groups. Let Y mi denote the outcome variable for procurement process or individual i in municipality m; mi the (heterogeneous) treatment effect, D m the treatment (high audit risk) indicator and U mi other unobserved factors that affect the outcome. The data generating process can then be described as:
Randomization ensures that, in expectation, D m is uncorrelated with U mi , so b O L S provides an unbiased and consistent estimator of the average treatment effect E. mi /: Rather than estimating equation (1) using OLS at the individual level and clustering standard errors at the municipality level, we estimate equation (1) with WLS using municipality level averages and weights equal to the number of procurement processes or survey respondents.
For the sake of transparency, we present results separately for the sample from the 32 nd lottery and for the pooled sample including the 31 st lottery, which we add to increase the pre-cision of our estimates. It is worth emphasizing that including municipalities from the 31 st lottery might lead to bias if outcomes were systematically different from one year to the next because the audit periods do not completely overlap as illustrated in Figure 1 . Fortunately this turns out to be a minor issue for most outcomes as evidenced by the fact that point estimates vary only slightly across the 32 nd lottery and pooled estimation samples. As a further robustness check, we restrict the sample of procurement processes to those that occurred in 2009 or
2010-excluding 2008-and again nd similar results (available on request).
Since treatment probabilities vary somewhat by state due to the conditional randomization, we also present speci cations with state xed effects. We provide a check on small sample bias by including pre-treatment municipality characteristics and mayor's characteristics, such as age, gender and education, as well as the mayor's party af liation into the regression. We present impact estimates separately for each set of included pre-treatment covariates because this provides the most transparent assessment of small sample bias. For the pooled sample with 120 municipalities we present impact estimates with cumulative controls in an Online
Appendix. 29
7 Estimation results 7.1 Impact on the number of procurement processes Table 9 presents impact estimates on the municipality-level number of local procurement processes.
Columns 1 through 5 are based solely on the 32 nd lottery and provide the raw difference in means and estimates with state intercepts, mayor party af liation dummies, municipality characteristics, and mayor's characteristics, respectively. Columns 6 through 10 show estimates from the same ve speci cations but for the pooled sample, including control municipalities from the 31 st lottery. The estimates uctuate around -3 to -4 processes and are statistically signi cant at 10 percent throughout and at 5 percent in the pooled sample, even before adding control variables. Given that the control group mean number of processes is about 14, the ef-fect corresponds to a 20 percent to 30 percent reduction approximately. Figure 2 shows that higher audit risk shifted the right-hand tail of the distribution of procurement processes to the left. The reduction in the number of procurement processes is entirely driven by fewer restricted modalities (results omitted to save space).
7.2 Impact on the proportion of restricted procurement processes Table 10 presents impact estimates for the municipality-level proportion of restricted procurement modalities. Impact estimates are all negative but they vary considerably across specications and across the 32 nd lottery and pooled estimation samples. Figure 3 shows that higher audit risk shifted the right-hand tail of the distribution of restricted procurement modalities to the left. This result is consistent with the nding on the number of procurement processes above since a typical way of circumventing more competitive procedures, such as a sealed-bid (reverse) auction, is to fractionalize the purchase (break it up into pieces) and conduct a series of restricted procurement processes, such as "bids only by invitation".
Impact on federal transfers and local spending
Another potential explanation for the reduction in restricted procurement modalities is that local managers were actually doing less procurement, not just different modalities, perhaps in order to sit out the high audit risk year. However, Table 11 shows that there is no evidence that high audit risk group municipalities were receiving less transfers from the central government during
2009. Figure 4 shows this result graphically. Since federal funds typically must be used during the scal year or else returned to the federal government, they cannot be saved for later periods.
As a result, no funding differential implies no local spending differential. The zero effect on local spending also makes sense from a practical point of view since for many goods, such as staple foods, medications or contracted-out cleaning services, local governments hold few or no inventories at all and so they need to make purchases to keep the administration running. Table 12 presents impact estimates on the proportion of irregular procurement processes. A process is deemed irregular if the audit result from Table 7 is anything other than regular or only a formal error. Impact estimates are remarkably close to -0.16 across speci cations, are statistically signi cant at 5 percent in the sample from the 32 nd lottery, and become statistically signi cant at 1 percent in the pooled sample, even without controls. Given that the control group mean proportion of irregular processes is 0.63, the effect corresponds to a 25 percent reduction approximately. Figure 5 shows that higher audit risk shifted the entire distribution of the proportion of irregular procurement processes to the left.
7.5 Impact on mismanagement or corruption in procurement Table 13 presents impact estimates on the proportion of procurement processes with evidence of mismanagement or corruption. Impact estimates uctuate around the -0.17 mark although they are more variable than for irregular processes. Nevertheless, the con dence intervals show substantial overlap. In fact, almost all estimates fall within the con dence intervals around any other estimate. As for irregular processes above, essentially all estimates are highly signi cant statistically. Figure 6 shows that higher audit risk shifted the entire distribution of the proportion of procurement processes with evidence of mismanagement or corruption to the left.
Impacts on health service delivery
The top part of Table 14 presents impact estimates for a range of outcomes related to the preventive and basic health care program (Saúde da Família). In contrast to the effects found for procurement, Table 14 shows no evidence that increased audit risk affected the quality of health care services provided by local governments. For example, the share of respondents who say they receive regular visits from community health staff-as required under the preventive health program-is essentially 93 percent in both treatment and control groups. The proportion of respondents who say they receive health care at home when needed is about 70 percent in the control group and about 6 to 7 percentage points higher in the high audit risk group, but the difference is not statistically signi cant. Overall, out of the eleven outcomes considered here, none are statistically different between treatment and control groups. Moreover, the size of the differences is typically small and often the sign of the difference is the opposite of what theory would suggest.
Impacts on compliance with Bolsa Família regulations
The bottom of Table 14 shows that higher audit risk did not seem to affect local compliance with national regulations of the conditional cash transfer program Bolsa Família either. The rst two outcomes show that targeting of bene ciaries was unaffected since the proportion of appropriately included bene ciaries is negligibly (and statistically insigni cantly) different between treatment and control respondents. The last three outcomes show the same qualitative result for compliance with health and education conditionalities. The high compliance rates evident in Table 14 suggest that the vast majority of Bolsa Família recipients were appropriately included in the program-they were poor enough-and that they ful lled the health and education conditionalities to a large extent.
Conclusion
Results in this paper suggest that temporarily increasing audit risk at the municipality level in
Brazil by about 20 percentage points reduced the proportion of local procurement processes involving mismanagement or corruption by about 17 percentage points. Higher audit risk also reduced the proportion of restricted procurement modalities adopted by local managers, while procurement amounts remained unaffected. As in Olken (2007), we cannot say whether these effects re ect a net reduction in rent extraction or merely a substitution over time-with high audit risk municipalities making up at least some lost rents in subsequent periods. In either case, our estimates provide clear evidence in favor of the prediction that local of cials reduce rent extraction in response to higher audit risk (Becker 1968 ).
In contrast, we nd no evidence that increased audit risk affected the quality of preventive and primary health care services, measured using client satisfaction surveys conducted by audi-tors. Since potential punishments for serious irregularities in procurement include jail, while for service delivery they only include nes or loss of the job, differences in potential punishments might drive the difference in results. A complementary interpretation is that irregularities in service provision cannot be identi ed with the same precision as irregularities in procurement and so higher audit risk might matter less to service providers, compared to procurement of cials.
We also nd no evidence that higher audit risk had an effect on local compliance with na- would take a permanent variation in audit risk to assess whether scaling up is indeed advisable, since local of cials might nd ways to adapt to increased audit risk over time. Another complication is that assessing the bene ts of higher audit risk in monetary terms requires an estimate of the value of a marginal increase in compliance with existing procurement regulations. A necessary rst step in this direction would be to quantify the cost savings from lower procurement costs. Unfortunately, however, audit ndings currently do not systematically report the price at which local goods and services were purchased. More detailed data is therefore required to better quantify the bene ts of higher audit intensity in terms of cost savings. . N is the number of municipalities from a given state that are eligible for sampling in the lottery. Draws is the number of municipalities from a given state that are sampled in the lottery. P(Treatment) is the probability of assignment to the high audit risk group, given in percentage points. Municipalities from Acre, Amapá and Roraima states are grouped together for this lottery. Notes : Source: Portaria Nº 1581, August 11 2009. N is the number of municipalities from a given state that are eligible for sampling in the lottery. Draws is the number of municipalities from a given state that are sampled in the lottery. P(Draw) is the sampling probability. Municipalities from Acre, Amapá and Roraima states are grouped together for this lottery. . N is the number of municipalities from a given state that are eligible for sampling in the lottery. Draws is the number of municipalities from a given state that are sampled in the lottery. P(Draw) is the sampling probability. P(Draw), P(Audit) and dP are given as percentages. For the treatment group, the probability of being drawn in the 32 nd lottery equals the probability of receiving a CGU audit between May 2009 and May 2010, P(Draw) = P(Audit). Ex ante (From May 8 2009 to the publication of Portaria Nº 862 on April 30 2010) this probability was 30/120 = 25%. Ex post, it is given above in column 3. For the control group, the probability of receiving a CGU audit between May 2009 and May 2010 depends on the probabilities of being drawn in the 29 th , 30 th , 31 st , and 32 nd lotteries. Under the assumption that the probabilities of being drawn in the first three lotteries were the same as in the 29 th lottery, P(Audit) for the control group is calculated according to the following approximation: P(Audit) = 1-[1-P(Draw 29 th )] 3 ×[1-P(Draw 32 nd )]. dP gives the ex ante and ex post difference in audit probabilities between treatment and control groups by state. Ferraz and Finan (2010) code an irregularity as a case of corruption only if " the public good was not provided" . Notes: WLS estimations with weights equal to the number of procurement processes in the municipality. A procurement process is coded irregular if the audit result from Notes: WLS estimations with weights equal to the number of procurement processes in the municipality. Corruption corresponds to cases of simulated (fake) tender processes, cases of favouritism, or when auditors determine that there were unjustified or excessive payments for goods or services, as well as cases of fractionalized procurement amounts. Management irregularities correspond to instances where less than three firms were invited to submit bids or procurement modalities were too restricted, as well as other irregularities. See Table 6 Notes : WLS estimations with weights equal to the number of survey respondents. The unit of observation is the municipality. Robust standard errors in parentheses. N varies by outcome. Fstatistics are for the joint hypotheses that all differences in outcomes are zero. 
High audit risk group
Notes: A procurement process is coded irregular if the audit result from Table 6 is anything other than regular or only a formal error. Sample consists of municipalities from the 32nd and 31st lotteries.
Empirical cumulative distribution functions 
Empirical cumulative distribution functions
Notes: Corruption corresponds to cases of simulated (fake) tender processes, cases of favouritism, or when auditors determine that there were unjustified or excessive payments for goods or services, as well as cases of fractionalized procurement amounts. Management irregularities correspond to instances where less than three firms were invited to submit bids or procurement modalities were too restricted, as well as other irregularities. See Table 6 for details. Sample consists of municipalities from the 32nd and 31st lotteries.
